I estimate the impact of the recent and unprecedented surge in drug-related violence in Mexico on the labor market outcomes of Mexican workers. Using a nationally representative longitudinal dataset that allows me to account for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity, I find that there is a negative relationship between local violence and labor market outcomes. Self-employed individuals are the most sensitive to a violent environment, with men experiencing significantly reduced earnings and productivity, while women decrease their hours of work or exit the labor force entirely. I also find suggestive evidence that fear of victimization plays an important role explaining these changes.
I. Introduction
Research suggests that high levels of violence alter the economic environment in ways that drastically impact individual and household behavior. 1 In particular, it can have an effect on both demand and supply sides of labor markets and the direction of the effect is ambiguous (Deininger, 2003; Kondylis, 2007; Calderón, Gáfaro and Ibáñez, 2011; Shemyakina, 2011; Bozzoli, Bruck and Wald, 2013; Fernández, Ibáñez and Peña, 2014) .
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While gauging the economic impact of violence is vital to accurately measuring its true costs, researchers in this literature face several empirical challenges. First, in most cases the location and timing of violence are not random or unanticipated, which potentially makes the sample of individuals who are affected highly selected. Second, changes of violence over time may be correlated with trends in other local characteristics, creating an omitted variable bias problem. Third, crime outbreaks often happen concurrently with other events that also impact wages and employment confounding a simple analysis of the relationship between violence and labor market outcomes. The recent escalation of drug related crime in Mexico combined with a rich and nationally representative longitudinal data set provide a unique opportunity to investigate the effects of violence on labor market outcomes while improving the methods used in the literature to estimate these effects.
1 A rich strand of the literature has shown evidence of the effects of high levels of violence on health outcomes (Bundervoet, Verwimp, and Akresh, 2009; Baez, 2011; Akresh, Lucchetti, and Thirumurthy, 2012; Mansour and Rees, 2012) , human capital investment (Barrera and Ibáñez, 2004; Shemyakina, 2010; Leon, 2012; Rodriguez and Sánchez, 2012) , and asset depletion and consumption (Ibáñez and Moya, 2010; Justino and Verwimp, 2013) . 2 On the supply side, labor participation can decrease because of fear of victimization or because of the emergence of illegal, but profitable, activities that decrease engagement in the legal labor. Labor supply could also increase if the earnings of the main breadwinner decrease because of violence, and other members of the household join the labor force (that is, and added-worker effect) to compensate for the loss in family income (Lundberg, 1985; Cunningham, 2001 ). Labor demand is also likely to be impacted by violence, and as with supply, the direction of the effect is ambiguous. Demand can decrease if firms affected by violence reduce costs by closing, downsizing, or not entering the market (Pshisva and Suárez, 2010; Camacho and Rodriguez, 2012; Collier and Duponchell, 2012) , or if high levels of violence diminishes foot traffic in previously thriving consumer centers. Alternatively, an increased presence of individuals with disposable income from illegal businesses may bolster economic activity, leading to an increase in labor demand. 4 Dell (2015) was the first to touch on the relationship between violent crime in Mexico and labor market outcomes. In this paper, I take a focused look at this relationship and extend
Dell's analysis as well as the literature on the economic effects of violence in several directions.
First, my analysis combines quasi-experimental geographic and temporal variation in violence throughout Mexico and a nationally representative longitudinal dataset. In so doing, it provides empirically rigorous estimates without a loss of external validity.
Second, most studies of the impact of violence on labor market outcomes rely on crosssectional data. The limitation of relying on cross-sectional data is that it is difficult to fully assess or control for the possible selection problem that arises from systematic avoidance of violent areas. If, for example, unobserved skills are related to both violence and labor outcomes, crosssectional estimates would be biased. The panel nature of the MxFLS, however, makes it possible to compare the outcomes of the same individuals when exposed to low versus high levels of violence, allowing me to control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. Below, I show this comparison is critical for accurate causal inference.
Third, I explore the impact of local violence on the respondent's time allocation outside the labor market. This novel feature of the analysis provides evidence on the potential mechanisms through which violence affects labor markets and is informative to assessing the potential long-term effects of exposure.
Fourth, I can explicitly test the most plausible threats to causal identification by using the Mexican Drug War as a natural experiment. Specifically, I show that there are no unobserved local trends correlated with both violence intensity and labor market outcomes. In addition, I
show that the Great Recession does not drive the results.
Lastly, according to the theoretical framework proposed by Becker and Rubenstein (2011) , an individual's ability to control their fear of victimization depends upon the economic costs and benefits of mitigating exposure. This suggests that individuals with the most influence over their own labor market engagement should experience the most profound changes to their economic status in response to the escalation of violence. The fine level of detail available in the MxFLS regarding an individual's employment type, status, activities and self-reported fear of victimization allows for a more nuanced understanding of the complex relationship between violence and labor market outcomes than currently exists in the literature.
Consistent with the Becker and Rubenstein (2011) hypothesis, I find that individuals with less attachment to the labor market are the most responsive to local violence. Exposure to an increase in the municipal homicide rate adversely affects the employment status and the number of hours worked by individuals with the weakest labor market attachment: self-employed women. The mechanism behind this relationship appears to be fear of victimization. In addition, exploring time allocation behavior provides evidence that when these women reduce their working hours they, in turn, increase their time spent on home-production activities. Finally, while crime does not lead self-employed males to drop out of the labor market, it does reduce their hourly and total earnings.
This paper provides evidence that, during the recent intensification of organized crime in Mexico, self-employed workers were the most vulnerable to the economic effects of local violence. These results suggest that when gauging the impact of violence it is critical to bear in mind the share of the workforce that is self-employed. However, it is important to note that these are short-term effects and that self-employed workers may simply respond faster to violence than wage-workers. As such, the non-effect for wage-workers in the short-term is not sufficient to conclude that this group will not be impacted by violence in the medium-or long-term.
The next section of this paper provides background on the Mexican experience of organized crime over the last decade and introduces the information available on homicides.
Section 3 reviews the literature on the impact of crime and violence on labor market outcomes.
Section 4 describes the Mexican Family Life Survey and reports descriptive statistics of the analytical sample. Section 5 provides a description of the empirical specification. Section 6 presents and discusses the main results. Section 7 discusses potential threats to identification and provides robustness checks. Section 8 offers concluding remarks.
II. Background
The rapid increase in violent crime in Mexico has led to considerable debate about its causes. 5 A strand of the literature characterizes it as a byproduct of the military strategy of increased 5 Guerrero-Gutiérrez (2011); Guerrero-Gutiérrez (2012); Molzahn, Rios, and Shirk (2012) ; Rios and Shirk (2012) ; Rios (2013); Dell (2015) ; Castillo, Mejia, and Restrepo (2018) .
confrontation with Organized Crime Groups (OCGs) that took place when Felipe Calderón became president (Guerrero-Gutiérrez, 2011; Molzahn, Rios and Shirk, 2012 ).
Calderón's military strategy targeting the main "capos" of the cartels destabilized the old oligopolistic equilibrium in which OCGs operated and maintained relatively low levels of violence.
6 Guerrero-Gutiérrez (2012) suggests that, by confronting the main leader of a drug trafficking group, two types of violence are created: first, an internal conflict arises for the leadership of the organization; and second, confrontations with enemy organizations that seek to wrest territorial control increase. Related to this debate, Dell (2015) compares municipalities where a mayor from Calderón's party (Partido Acción Nacional -PAN) won the election by a margin of 5 percent or less to municipalities in which the PAN lost by the same margin.
Comparing these municipalities 6 months before and 6 months after the election, Dell finds a significant increase in drug-related homicides in the municipalities where Calderón's party won,
suggesting that PAN related policies may have triggered the increase in homicides.
This rapid and intense increase in violence can be observed in the official homicide rate reported by INEGI. 7 According to this data source, the annual homicide rate has increased in However, from 2009 there is not only an increase in the national homicide rates but also a wide dispersion of violence into municipalities that previously had no contact with the drug war.
In addition to the increased number of confrontations between groups, the rising competition between OCGs led them to diversify their financial sources. While drug trafficking activities still account for most of the drug cartels' economic resources, in order to increase profits and fund their fight against the military and other OCGs, they relied more on criminal activities that directly affect the civil population, like kidnappings, extortions and car thefts.
Moreover, the visibility of crimes changed the dynamics of the violence in Mexico. "Narcomessages" became a very popular method to signal territorial presence and to spread fear not just 8 The data that measures homicides related to organized crime was released by the Mexican government in December of 2010, and provides information of number of homicides "allegedly linked to organized crime" from December 2006 to September of 2011. The numbers from this data set show a rise in the annual homicide rate of more than 550% between 2007 and 2011; from 2.67 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2007 to 12.6 in 2010 and 18 in 2011 (dashed line in Figure 1 shows monthly homicide rates).
across other OCGs, but also authorities, journalists, and any citizen that did not support their actions. Moreover, the lack of trust in the State's institutions and the high levels of corruption and abuses from the police exacerbated the feeling of fear by the civilian population (DiazCayeros et al., 2011; Guerrero-Gutiérrez, 2011 (Molzahn, Rios and Shirk, 2012) .
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III. The Economic Effects of Crime and Violence
Although a number of studies analyze the causes of the increasing violence in Mexico, relatively few studies measure the impact of crime on individual outcomes. While it is not the focus of her paper, Dell (2015) made the first contribution to this literature by exploiting a network model of drug-trafficking routes and information from the National Survey of Occupation and Employment (ENOE) to measure the short-term economic effects of drug-related violence.
Using a regression discontinuity strategy, Dell's results suggest that 6 months after a narrow PAN election win there are no effects on male labor participation or wages in the formal sector.
By contrast, she finds negative effects on male wages in the informal sector and on female labor force participation. This study complements Dell's work by exploiting an alternative source of quasi-random variation, extending it to a nationally representative sample, exploring changes at the intensive margins of market and household labor supply, and investigating sources of heterogeneity that provide evidence on the mechanisms behind these relationships.
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In addition, the rich individual data in the MxFLS allows this study to explore the heterogeneity of the relationship between exposure to violence and labor market outcomes by subjective measures of victimization, and to provide suggestive evidence of fear as a potential mechanism. Specifically, Becker and Rubinstein (2011) suggest that the ability to manage the fear of victimization depends on the economic costs and benefits associated with controlling these emotions. In this framework, Becker and Rubinstein (2011) categorize individuals as "occasional" or "regular" users depending on how frequently an individual performs an activity that could increase their likelihood of victimization. If the economic benefit to overcoming the fear of violence is higher among regular users than among occasional users, the model predicts that occasional users will be more sensitive to violence.
In the context of Mexico, the cost and benefits associated with overcoming the fear of victimization when participating in the labor force may differ by gender (for example, women in
Mexico have lower labor force attachment than men and therefore are more likely to be "occasional users") and by type of occupation (wage workers would be considered "regular users" due to the fact that having a contract reduces a wage workers' flexibility in leaving or altering their intensity of engagement with the labor market). By exploring these margins, this paper contributes to the current literature by examining the underlying mechanisms driving this relationship and providing insights applicable to more general settings of violence.
There also exists a broader literature measuring the impact of violence on labor market outcomes and household's economic conditions (Deininger, 2003; Kondylis, 2007; Calderón, Gáfaro and Ibáñez, 2011; Shemyakina, 2011; Bozzoli, Bruck and Wald, 2013; Fernández, Ibáñez and Peña, 2014 (Rubalcava and Teruel, 2006) . 12 The MxFLS is designed to follow baseline respondents and their children born after 2002 independently of whether they moved within Mexico or to the U.S.
12 Although the MxFLS is a nationally representative survey of the Mexican population, it is also important to provide evidence about its geographic representativeness of the increase in homicides over the period examined in this paper. The results of this test are provided in Online Appendix The longitudinal nature of the MxFLS and its rich content make it an ideal source to study the behavior and economic outcomes of Mexican individuals and households. However, the contribution of using longitudinal data depends on the extent to which the original sample is successfully reinterviewed in each following wave. With regard to this study, it is especially important that both overall attrition and attrition within subgroups of the population are unrelated to the increasing wave of violence.
Overall, the MxFLS has achieved very low levels of attrition. In the second and third waves, over 89% of the baseline panel respondents were re-contacted. However, even though the re-contact rates provide evidence of a successful follow-up, if attrition is correlated with homicide rates the sample could lose its representativeness. Section VII contains the results of a test for selected attrition on measures of violence. The model is estimated separately for men and women and, in an alternative specification, allows for non-linearities in the measures of violence.
I find no evidence of a relationship between violence exposure and attrition.
The MxFLS provides a number of advantageous features for studying the impact of the Mexican Drug War on the lives of Mexican citizens. First, as mentioned previously, the second wave (MxFLS2) was conducted in 2005-06 (during a period of "normal" levels of homicide rates) and the second follow-up (MxFLS3) was conducted between 2009 and 2012 (during a period of high levels of violence). As indicated in Figure 1 , the timing of the MxFLS allows the comparison of outcomes of the same individual in periods of low and high levels of violence, which removes any time-invariant heterogeneity that could affect both the exposure to violence and the outcomes of interest (for example, fixed ability).
homicide rate between 2005 and 2009 (Column 2). There is no evidence in any of the specifications that the MxFLS2 municipalities capture changes in the violent crime environment that are not present at the national level.
Second, in the MxFLS there has been a concerted effort made to follow migrants within Mexico and to the U.S. This is particularly important for this study because migration may be a behavioral response to violent crime. For the sample of interest in this paper, 13.8 percent of the respondents migrated between the two waves, of which 5.6 percentage points were found in a different municipality between the two waves. The rest were found in the same municipality but report a long-term migration (more than one year) outside their municipality of residence. If migration is due to unobserved characteristics correlated with labor market outcomes and related to violence, it could bias the coefficients of interest. In the next section I examine migration as a behavioral response to violence and discuss whether it is a source of bias.
Third, the MxFLS has a rich set of characteristics about its participants, including information about the economic, social, and health status of each member of a surveyed household. Of particular interest for this study, the MxFLS contains a great deal of content about a respondent's labor market participation. For instance, employment is defined to include formal and informal jobs, as well as occupation and sector of employment. In addition, information on the earnings and weeks/hours worked is collected for the respondent's two main jobs. By examining information on the earnings and hours worked for an individual over the last 12 months, the analysis of the impact of violence not only explores net participation in labor markets, but also total earnings and a measure of productivity (hourly earnings). In addition to a detailed labor market activity component, the MxFLS collects information regarding a respondent's non-work time allocation and subjective measures of fear. These items can be used to explore how the overall daily activities of those who are exposed to violent crime are affected as well as help provide evidence on potential mechanisms. shows the p-value of their difference. 13 Individuals living in places that suffered a higher increase in violence were, on average, more educated, their household size was smaller, they were less likely to be self-employed and were more likely to have relatives in the U.S. These observable differences highlight the importance of exploiting a longitudinal survey that can take into account the initial differences that existed among individuals living in each type of community.
A. Descriptive Statistics
The MxFLS also includes questions about self-perception and self-reported experience of violence. Table 1 shows that, for these measures, individuals from areas that would later become more violent did not have significantly higher perceptions of violence, nor did they report more experiences of violence before the escalation in organized crime. These results provide preliminary evidence that the heterogeneous increase in violence was unanticipated and not related to prior trends in perceptions of local safety.
These measures of perceived violence also provide insight with regard to the extent to which INEGI municipal homicide rates are correlated with reported feelings of fear. This correlation is important as it can help establish that the local homicide rates are relevant for the 13 Table A2 in the Online Appendix shows means for the same sample from Table 1 and the same variables measured in MxFLS2 and MxFLS3 without disaggregating the sample by levels of violence.
respondents. 14 Table 2 shows the correlation between the change in the 12-month homicide rate between the MxFLS2 and MxFLS3 interview in the individual's municipality of residence in MxFLS2 and 6 different measures of self-perception of violence measured in MxFLS3 after the surge in crime began.
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Panel A reports the results for the entire sample, Panel B for males and Panel C for females. For the three samples a strong correlation between the change in the homicide rate and the self-perceptions of violence can be observed. Specifically, an increase in the homicide rate is associated with reporting more fear of being assaulted, both during the day and at night, a perception of being less safe relative to 5 years ago, and the adoption of avoidance behaviors.
B. Sample Selection
From Using data from the National Survey on Victimization and Perception of Public Security (ENVIPE), OrozcoAleman and Gonzalez-Lozano (2018) documented a negative relationship between violence and perceptions of public safety. 15 Specifically, three binary measures of self-reported perceived violence (the positive probability of being assaulted, fear of being assaulted during the day/night, and feeling less safe than 5 years ago) and two binary measures of selfreported behaviors that could change the likelihood of victimizations (go out at night very frequently or frequently, and go out less than 5 years ago) are used as the dependent variables. The model is described in detail in Online Appendix B. 16 The sample used in Table 2 is conditional on being an active member of the labor force in MxFLS2. This is the same sample used for the main analysis. This sample is smaller than the sample in Table 3 and 70 in MxFLS2) and on being in the labor force in MxFLS2 both in the formal and informal sectors (the sample is only conditioned on being an active member of the labor force in MxFLS2, without restrictions on occupation in MxFLS2 or MxFLS3). After these restrictions, I am left with a total sample of 9,587 respondents. The results of this paper are representative of individuals who were of working age and in the labor force before the escalation in violence.
V. Empirical Strategy
Drawing on a longitudinal survey that allows for the comparison of the same individual Tables C1 and C2 in the Online Appendix provide 17 Rios (2013) finds positive effects on migration, but cannot distinguish between internal and international migration; Basu and Pearlman (2017) , find no effect on migration within Mexico, and no effect on international migration at the municipal level; Orozco-Aleman and Gonzalez-Lozano (2018) finds a significant increase on Mexican migration to the U.S.
evidence regarding the existence of this type of systematic behavioral response. The results provide some evidence of selective migration, suggesting that controlling for this endogenous migration could be important for causal identification.
To test for the potential bias from migration in a more direct way, I estimate the main specification with and without migrants. This is a novel analysis because migrants are not typically followed. Precise information about migration status allows me to directly test whether migration biases the results without making assumptions about its potential impact. Once the panel nature of the data is used with an individual fixed-effects model, the results are not significantly different when migrants are excluded.
However, given the results from previous literature and those in Tables C1 and C2, this paper follows a conservative approach to deal with potential selective migration. Specifically, the main empirical specification follows an intent-to-treat approach in which the municipality of residence in the second wave of the MxFLS is used to determine an individual's exposure to violence instead of municipality of residence in the third wave.
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Another challenge when estimating the effect of violence on labor market outcomes is omitted variable bias. The difficulty in estimating the relationship between violence and labor market outcomes could emerge from the fact that homicide rates have not increased in a random fashion over time and might not be orthogonal to unobserved factors that affect economic performance at municipality or individual level. To control for this unobserved heterogeneity, the empirical specification exploits the temporal and geographic variation in homicides rates between 2005 and 2009-12 in an individual fixed-effects framework. This model is particularly useful if we believe that there are time-invariant characteristics of individuals, such as ability that 18 The results of the main analysis are not qualitatively or significantly quantitatively changed if exposure to violence is based on current municipality of residence.
are correlated with both labor outcomes and violence. 19 Moreover, if homicides are reported with error, the individual fixed-effects strategy will diminish its impact by differencing out the portion of the error that is constant over time.
The empirical strategy can be generalized in the following regression framework:
where y is the outcome of interest of individual i living in municipality j at the time of the MxFLS2 interview, and who is living in municipality m when interviewed in month and in year t. The measure of violence in these models, !"#$%&' !" , is the quartic root of the INEGI homicide rate over the 12 months prior to the MxFLS interview date, t, in the individual's municipality of residence in MxFLS2, j. 20 The quartic root transformation of the homicide rate is used because it approximates the logarithmic transformation, reducing the influence of outliers with the distinct advantage of not excluding municipalities with homicide rates of zero (Thomas et al. 2006; Tarozzi et al. 2014; and, Ashraf et al., 2015) . 21 As noted above, the panel nature of the data allows the use of individual fixed-effects, denoted by ! ! in Equation 1. In addition, ! !"#$ , a vector of individual and household time-varying characteristics (marital status, whether the respondent lives with his/her parents, household size, number of children in the household, whether the place of residence is rural or urban, expectations of future migration, a measure of risk aversion and patience, a measure of emotional well-being and presence of relatives in the U.S.), is included; GDP at the state and year levels, !"# !" , is included as a time-varying measure 19 Online Appendix Table D1 provides an analysis of the relationship between attrition and homicides and finds no significant relationships. However, if attrition is related to unobserved characteristics of the respondent it will bias a simple cross-sectional analysis. By making all comparisons within an individual, the internal validity threat of selective attrition is alleviated. 20 The results are robust to using the homicide rate over the last 6 months for women, and over the last 1, 3, or 6 months for men. 21 Approximately 32 percent of the municipalities report zero homicides in 2005, 33 in 2006, 28 in 2009, 29 in 2010. of the state level economy; and, ! ! and ! ! represent controls for year and quarter of interview fixed-effects, respectively.
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The outcomes of interest, y, denote labor force participation for respondents age 18 to 70 in MxFLS2, number of hours worked, hourly earnings, and total earnings over the last 12 months for individuals working in both waves. Specifically, the measure of hours worked is the quartic root of the total number of hours worked in the last 12 months, and the measures of earnings are the quartic root of hourly earnings and total earnings in the last 12 months.
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Fear of being victimized is an important channel that can directly affect an individual's decision to participate in the labor market. This effect is likely to be different for men and women if the dynamics of crime are heterogeneous by gender, as is the case in Mexico. 24 Thus, the models will be estimated separately by gender. In addition, the difference in relative flexibility of engagement with the labor market at the intensive and extensive margin between wage-workers and the self-employed motivate stratifying the models by sector of employment as well. The stratification by employment sector is only based on occupation in MxFLS2 and not MxFLS3, as the occupational choice in MxFLS3 could be endogenously related to violence.
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22 Specifications alternatively using time trends, and year and month fixed-effects were also estimated and do not change the reported findings. 23 Hours worked and earnings in the last month may be noisy measures of labor outcomes, particularly for selfemployed individuals whose labor income and hours can significantly vary within the year. For this reason I use earnings and hours worked in the last 12 months. Moreover, some individuals report zero hours worked or spent on certain activities and zero earnings, thus using a logarithmic transformation would drop a number of observations. The quartic root transformation is used instead as it behaves similarly to a logarithmic transformation for positive numbers without dropping zeros (Thomas et al. 2006; Tarozzi et al. 2014; and, Ashraf et al., 2015) . 24 Not only has the number of female homicides increased 120% from 2007 to 2012 (INEGI) but also, the violence used in female homicides has been more gruesome and personal. While more than 40% of the homicide cases of men are deaths caused by a firearm, female deaths are more violent -strangulation and the use of a sharp object are the most common incidences of homicide (United Nations Mujeres, 2011). Moreover, sexual violence against women in Mexico has also increased these years, and a study from the United Nations shows that Mexico is the country with the highest percentage of women who have suffered this kind of victimization.
As a complement to the labor market behavior analysis, time allocation information is used to investigate the activities that are acting as substitutes to any potential change in hours worked. To do this, the quartic transformation of the number of hours per week spent on domestic chores, caretaking of elderly or young household and non-household members, and helping household members on their schoolwork are separately explored. Table 3 provides estimates of Equation 1 using participation in the labor market (Column 1), the quartic root of hours worked over the last 12 months (Column 2), the quartic root of hourly earnings (Column 3), and the quartic root of total earnings (Column 4) as dependent variables. In addition, the models are stratified by gender and by occupation (self-employment and wageemployment).
VI. Results
Panels A and B of Table 3 provide results for self-employed men and wage-earning men, respectively. The estimates in Column 1 and 2 indicate that the labor force participation of selfemployed and wage-working men, both on the extensive and intensive margins, was not significantly changed by increased exposure to homicides. This result suggests that the level of engagement in the labor market of men in Mexico is not sensitive to the intensity of local violent crime.
Interestingly, while labor market participation does not seem to be related to violence for working men in Mexico, the coefficients in Columns 3 and 4 suggest that the earnings from work, both hourly and total, are adversely affected by increased local homicides. Moreover, it is the earnings of self-employed men that seem to be particularly vulnerable to elevated rates of violence. Specifically, evaluating the coefficient of Column 3 for self-employed men at the mean of self-employed males' earnings and at the mean of the homicide rate in MxFLS2, the marginal effect of an additional homicide per 100,000 people is associated with a reduction in hourly earnings of 0.37 pesos. 26 Given that the average homicide rate increase between 2005 and 2011 was approximately 15 homicides per 100,000, this result suggests that the average self-employed male experienced a decrease in hourly earnings of 5.6 pesos, which amounts to 15% loss of their hourly earnings. This loss in hourly earnings for self-employed men paired with no adjustment in hours worked translates into a significant decrease in their total annual earnings (Column 4): an additional homicide per 100,000 people is associated with a reduction in total earnings of 328 pesos, which amounts to an 11.4% loss.
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The negative impact on the total earnings of self-employed men lends support to anecdotal evidence that self-employed individuals have been the most affected by violence.
According to the MxFLS, over 50% of self-employed men work in retail, commerce and manufacturing activities (men in the manufacturing sector are mainly auto mechanics, taxi drivers, artisans, electricians and masons). It is reasonable to think these vocations would be particularly sensitive to violence because consumers living in insecure municipalities will be less likely to engage in commerce in the evening or hire the services of workers who would have access to the employer's home. Because there is no evidence of an effect on labor supply, it appears that self-employed men are not closing their businesses early or shutting them down but rather the lower demand for their services or goods is negatively affecting their income. An alternative hypothesis is that the decrease in earnings was generated by a shift to lower-paid 26 This is calculated as: occupations. In order to explore this hypothesis, I included controls for time-varying characteristics of the job into the main analysis. Table E1 in the Online Appendix provides the results. Column 1 replicates the results shown in Table 3 , Column 2 includes indicator variables for the two-digit Mexican classification of occupation type, Column 3 includes indicator variables for aggregated categories of employment, Columns 4-13 add 8 different binary measures of benefits received in the worker's job, and Column 14 uses all of the controls. 28 The results show that the estimated effects of violence on self-employed earnings are robust to the inclusion of these characteristics. Moreover, a model that interacts homicide rates with selfemployment in MxFLS3 suggests that individuals who were self-employed in both waves were among the most affected by violence. These results provide evidence that movements between job types or changes in the work environment do not explain the negative effect of violence exposure on earnings.
A standard concern when examining the impact of an event on earnings is that, because individuals who leave the labor market no longer report earnings, this selection mechanism could potentially bias the results. In order to explore this concern, I conduct a sensitivity test in which earnings of 0 are assigned to all individuals who were working in MxFLS2 but were not working in MxFLS3. If individuals who became unemployed in high violence areas had lower initial earnings as compared to individuals who became unemployed in low violence areas, this robustness test should attenuate the original estimates. After making this adjustment, the magnitude and precision of the main estimates do not appreciably change (Online Appendix   Table E2 ).
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A similar concern is that individuals with higher earnings might be more reticent to report their labor income during high levels of violence. If this were true, the sample of respondents would be possibly selected, potentially biasing the results. To address this concern, Online Appendix Table E3 shows the results of a non-response model for men who were working in Table 3 show the results for self-employed and wage-working females, respectively. The results in Column 1 suggest that exposure to violence has little to no impact on wage-working women, but it has a negative and significant effect on the labor force participation of self-employed women. Specifically, a self-employed woman who was living in a municipality with zero violence exposure in 2005 (20% of the municipalities in the MxFLS2 sample) and then experienced the average increase in violence (that is, 15 in 100,000 homicides) would decrease her likelihood of labor force participation by approximately 14%. 30 In addition, Column 2 shows that the hours worked in the labor force went down among self-employed women that experienced an increase in local violence. Specifically, an additional homicide per 100,000 29 The results in Online Appendix Table E2 are shown for self-employed men, the group for which there is a significant impact of violence exposure on earnings in the main results. The estimates for the other groups are also unchanged qualitatively or quantitatively when applying this sensitivity analysis. 30 0.07*(15 1/4 )=0.14.
people reduces annual hours worked by 32.66, which evaluated at the mean increase of violence, corresponds to a 489.9 hour decrease, or a 33% reduction in the annual hours worked for a selfemployed woman.
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Among those self-employed women that remain in the labor force (Column 3 and 4 of Panel C) there is an imprecisely estimated increase in hourly earnings in more violent communities. 32 This positive relationship may be as a result of the decreased labor supply effect found in Columns 1 and 2.
Online Appendix Table E4 provides the results of a fully interacted model for the sample of men and women who were self-employed in MxFLS2, which can be used to directly compare the effects of violence on labor market outcomes for men versus women. As expected, there is strong evidence that violence has different effects based on gender. Increases in violence appear to decrease the labor force participation of women. By contrast, violence is associated with a decrease in wages and earnings of men.
A. Longitudinal Data
As an illustration of the importance of accounting for unobserved heterogeneity, in Online Appendix Table E5 In fact, the magnitude on the positive estimate for hourly earnings for self-employed women is actually larger than the negative and statistically significant effect found for self-employed men. 33 Brown et al. (2018) and Vieider and DiFalco (2018) provide evidence of the importance of using panel data when estimating the effects of shocks on risk preferences.
results from alternative models that do not use the longitudinal characteristics of the MxFLS 34 and Columns 7-9 replicate the main specification from Table 3 . 35 Using only the MxFLS3 relies exclusively on geographic variation in violence to identify the relationship of interest, and therefore the lowest level of regional fixed-effect that can be reasonably employed are state fixed-effects. 36 The results from this model counter-intuitively suggest that there is a positive effect of violence on the earnings of men and women. The obvious concern with this approach is that, while it exploits the geographic variation of violence, it does not exploit its temporal variation. Moreover, the results could be biased if unobserved individual heterogeneity is related to both violence and labor market outcomes.
The second model (Columns 4-6) uses both MxFLS2 and MxFLS3 as pooled crosssectional data (individuals ages 18-70 in MxFLS2 and those ages 18-70 in MxFLS3) without utilizing the individual fixed-effects available from the panel nature of the data. An advantage of this model is that by increasing the amount of temporal variation, finer levels of regional fixedeffects (specifically at the municipality level) can be included. The results provide no evidence of a relationship between violence and earnings. The potential flaw of this strategy is that, while it exploits temporal variation, it can not control for unobserved individual heterogeneity related both with the intensity of local violence exposure and labor outcomes.
The preferred identification strategy (Columns 7-9), which replicates the results from Table 3 , exploits the panel nature of the survey and compares the labor outcomes of the same individual exposed to different levels of violence. This strategy removes individual-and 34 In both models I control for a rich set of individual and household characteristics, year of interview, quarter of interview fixed-effects and regional fixed-effects (state fixed-effects in the first case, since the homicide rate variable is measured at the municipality level; and municipality fixed-effects in the second model). 35 Online Appendix Table E5 does not show results for the probability of participation in the labor force since the variation for this variable comes from exploiting the panel data.
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Alternatively using no regional fixed-effects or municipality-level fixed-effects do not qualitatively change the results when treating MxFLS3 as a cross-section. Within-municipality variation comes from differences in date of interview.
community-specific heterogeneity caused by, for instance, selective attrition and allows selective migration to be controlled by assigning exposure based on pre-escalation level of violence in their place of residence. If this unobserved heterogeneity is not leading to bias, estimates that also exploit the temporal and geographic variation of violence should not be substantially different from estimates produced using the preferred specification.
A comparison of the different models highlights the importance of controlling for these potential sources of bias. For instance, when the longitudinal nature of the data is exploited, a clear negative relationship between violence and earnings emerge. As shown in Online Appendix Table E5 , this relationship would have been hidden by unobserved heterogeneity had only crosssectional data been available.
B. Mechanisms
A potential mechanism to explain the negative effect of violence on labor force participation of self-employed women is fear of victimization. If women are afraid of being victimized, the opportunity cost of leaving the labor market decreases. Moreover, self-employed individuals might have more flexibility when deciding to leave the labor market temporarily or cutting back on their working hours.
In order to explore whether fear is a possible mechanism for the negative relationship between labor market outcomes of self-employed and violence intensity, I estimate Equation 1 stratifying the groups presented in Table 3 according to the subjective measures of fear measured in MxFLS3. 37 The results provide suggestive evidence that fear is a potential mechanism driving the effect of violence on the reduction of labor market participation of self-employed women 37 When analyzing the sample of wage-workers, both for men and women, the results are statistically the same for individuals who report more or less fear. Similarly, self-employed males who report more fear are not more affected by violence.
both at the intensive and extensive margin. Panel A of Table 4 provides the estimates for all women (the same results of Panel C in Table 3 ), Panel B for women who report to have changed transportation to avoid being victimized, Panel C for women who report "a lot of fear" of being assaulted during the day, and Panel D for women who report "a lot" or "some" fear of being assaulted during the day. The negative and significant effect not only persists in these subsamples but the magnitude of the effect of violence is considerably larger for these women.
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Considering these results in combination with those in Table 2 , it appears that both men and women feel higher levels of fear because of the increase of violence, but only self-employed women respond to it by changing their labor force participation. This could be because the activities of self-employed men and women are different and/or because the opportunity cost of leaving the labor force is lower for women who in most cases are not the main breadwinner in the household. 40 In order to explore this explanation, I compare working and non-working people in MxFLS3 in Online Appendix Table E6 for the sample of women who were self-employed in MxFLS2. The results show that women who are not working in MxFLS3 are older, more likely to be married, less educated and had lower earnings and PCE, and thus more likely to have a lower opportunity cost of leaving the labor force.
Given that there exists a significant alteration of labor market activity for self-employed women exposed to violence, I next use Equation 1 to investigate which activities are being substituted into as a consequence of this change in behavior. The results of this analysis can be 38 The effect of violence on labor participation is still negative and significant but the magnitude is smaller for women who do not report fear of being assaulted during the day or women who did not change transportation. 39 Similarly, Brown et al. (2018) find that individuals exposed to violence in Mexico become more risk averse and the main channel through which violence operates is an individual's increased perception of potential victimization rather than financial, or mental health channels. 40 11% of self-employed men and 20% of self-employed women work on retail; and, 3.5% of self-employed men offer personal services while 14% of self-employed women do. Moreover, when disaggregating the sample of selfemployed women by a more disaggregated level of occupations the results show that women in retail/commerce and manufacturing are the most likely to leave the labor force or reduce their working hours.
found in Table 5 . When exploring the non-labor time allocation of self-employed women exposed to violence, the results suggest that they are trading working hours for time spent on domestic chores and/or helping a household member with their schoolwork (Panel A, Table 5 ).
Evaluated at the average increase of violence for a self-employed woman, an increase in violence is associated with an increase in time allocated to domestic chores by 17% and an increase in time helping other household members with their schoolwork by 20%. Panel B in Table 5 provides estimates of the same analysis for women working as employees. For this sample the results for time spent on home production are not significant and the magnitude of the coefficients is close to zero. These results suggests that the significant time allocation change for self-employed women exposed to violence is not driven by an unobserved trend common to all working women. For women of both employment types, time spent on caregiving, entertainment, and agricultural activities were not significantly related to violence exposure.
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In addition, there is no evidence that alternative income sources are substituting for the lost monetary earnings from work for these women. I directly test this by investigating whether violence has had an effect on the probability of receiving transfers (monetary or in-kind), on the amount of the transfers, and on non-labor income. These estimates, found in Online Appendix Table E7 , show that violence did not lead to an increase in transfers or non-labor income for these women.
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An alternative potential mechanism to compensate for the loss in income is to rely on labor participation of young men in the family. Brown and Velasquez (2017) found evidence 41 Results available upon request. 42 Online Appendix Table E7 shows the results of a model with individual fixed-effects for self-employed women in MxFLS2. Column 1 displays the results for the probability of getting a transfer from any relative or friend; Column 2 shows estimations for the total amount of transfers received; and, Column 3 provides the results for non-labor income. Non-labor income includes subsidies or governmental aid; scholarships or donations; indemnities against labored risks, employment liquidation, and workers compensation; and, retirement funds, retirement or pension.
supporting this mechanism. Specifically, their results suggest that young men of self-employed parents who are exposed to local violence in Mexico are at significantly higher risk to drop out of school and join the labor force.
C. Discussion
Overall, the results of these analyses highlight the significant heterogeneity of the effects of violence in Mexico on labor market outcomes. Specifically, the findings suggest that selfemployed individuals are the most adversely affected by increasing local violence. If the effect of violence on earnings is working through the demand side, we might expect to see comparable effects for male wage earners in similar occupations. One hypothesis for why the self-employed might be more vulnerable to this kind of shock is that their labor income is immediately affected by a lower demand in the market, while the wages of employees shift more slowly due to predetermined contracts. Another possible explanation for this relationship is that these men are suffering from decreased economic activity caused by fear of being victimized in these dangerous localities. This interpretation is consistent with the findings of Levitt and Venkatesh (2000) , who show that violence from gang wars in Chicago kept customers away from the conflict area and this negative demand shock negatively affected both the price and quantity of drugs sold.
Moreover, the analysis indicates that there is a significant difference in the labor market reactions of self-employed males that face increased violence relative to self-employed females.
While self-employed males' labor force participation has not been affected by the increase in violent crime, the results suggest that a nontrivial number of self-employed females are leaving the labor market or reducing their hours worked, and substituting these working hours with increased home production. This result is particularly important in an already unequal society, as any shock that disproportionately affects women also needs to be recognized as contributor to a widening gender gap.
When evaluating the long-term consequences of the increase of violence in Mexico, one must also consider whether individuals can adapt or habituate to this new environment of violence (De Choudhury, Monroy-Hernández, and Mark, 2014) . The empirical literature on the economics of crime provides little guidance regarding the scope for adaption to violence. In this study, the limited heterogeneity in the timing of the interviews that take place after the escalation in violence does not allow for a thorough, direct evaluation of this potential behavioral response.
As a way of providing suggestive evidence with respect to adaption, I examine whether the effects of violence on labor market outcomes are larger for individuals living in areas that had lower levels of violence prior to the spike in homicide rates. If individuals adapt their behavior in response to a violent environment, then respondents with exposure to higher levels of homicides prior to the intensification of violent would be expected to have a less severe reaction to its intensification. However, the results of these estimations show that the overall effect of the change in violence on economic outcomes does not differ depending on the previous level of violence exposure (Online Appendix Table E8 ).
VII. Threats to Identification and Robustness Checks
This analysis exploits an unprecedented, temporally sharp, geographically diverse, and plausibly exogenous change in the Mexican conflict environment paired with within-respondent comparisons to evaluate the relationship between exposure to violent crime and labor market outcomes. The main threats to causal identification that remain are unobserved municipal trends Velasquez 29 or a parallel event that is correlated with both the escalation in violence in Mexico and labor market outcomes. The potential confounder that could generate the results of this paper would need to present similar temporal and geographic heterogeneity as found in Figures 1 and 2 .
Furthermore, it would have to only impact self-employed individuals and impact men and women in dissimilar ways.
In order to provide evidence regarding the exogeneity of the surge in crime observed in were the case that the crime surge was due to, for instance, underlying economic trends, then we would expect significant effects of violence in this specification. The results from this analysis are presented in Table 6 .
Panel A and B provide the results for self-employed and wage-employed men. For both occupation groups, the estimates for earnings and hourly earnings are insignificant and the signs are positive, suggesting that if an underlying unobserved trend exists it would likely only serve to cause an underestimate of the effects found in Table 3 . Panel C reports the effects for selfemployed women. The relationship between violence and labor force participation is negative but insignificant and 42% smaller than the estimate in the main specification. Moreover, the placebo test estimate on hours worked for self-employed women (Panel C, Column 2) is insignificant and positive, contrary to what was found in Table 3 . In general, each of the estimates in the placebo test is insignificant at the 10% level. Overall, these results provide support for the assumption that the main results in Table 3 Table E9 suggest that prior municipality characteristic trends are not correlated with the location of greater levels of changes in violent conflict. 43 This provides further evidence that the change in a municipality's level of violence is not simply a reflection of underlying linear trends in other characteristics of that municipality.
The type of confounder that can not be ruled out by the previous tests is a change in the labor market outcomes of the self-employed that has similar geographic heterogeneity to the change in violent crime and also happens non-linearly immediately before or simultaneously to the escalation of violence. One potential source of this type of bias would be present if the 2008 financial crisis impacted Mexico with the same temporal and geographic heterogeneity as the 43 Only 3 coefficients are significant at the 10% level out of 31 independent variables, which is the amount of significant covariates that would be expected by chance.
change in violence and self-employed men's earnings and self-employed women's labor market participation were the most sensitive to that economic shock. Two additional tests are conducted to test the sensitivity of the main analysis to the potential biasing effects of the economic downturn.
44 Table 7 Table 8 show that the estimates of the main specification hold. 44 GDP at the state level is already included in the main specification. 45 Table 7 only provides the results for the outcomes and sub-samples that had significant results in the main specification. Estimates for all other outcomes and samples are also qualitatively and quantitatively equivalent to Table 3 . 46 The source for the unemployment rate is the Census. This variable is available at the municipality level for 2000 and 2010. The characteristics of the manufacturing industry and retail sector are available at the municipality and yearly level through the Sistema Estatal y Municipal de Bases de Datos (SIMBAD). All the data can be downloaded from INEGI at www.inegi.com. 47 I have also estimated additional regressions adding characteristics for other economic sectors: basic services, financial services, private (non-financial) services, and transportation. The results are consistent across all specifications.
Lastly, in order to test for potential selective attrition as a consequence of increased violence, a model is estimated that predicts whether the probability of attrition from MxFLS3 is related to the municipal homicide rate. While the use of an individual fixed-effects strategy shields the estimates from most internal validity bias from violence-related selective attrition, a relationship between survey retention and the local violence environment would diminish the external validity of the results. The details of the model are in Online Appendix D and the results are reported in Online Appendix Table D1 . The results provide strong evidence that living in a municipality that would have a larger increase in violence did not lead to higher probability of survey attrition.
VIII. Conclusion
Being able to identify the impact of national and local events has great policy relevance to governments and policy-makers as they try to assist the individuals who have been adversely affected. However, identifying the effect of negative environmental changes presents important challenges. First, in the case of a destructive event, like violent crime, it is generally not possible to use a randomized experiment to measure its impact. Second, for a simple natural or quasiexperiment to be valid, the change has to be unexpected and unrelated to other characteristics of the time and place. Third, if the event is of substantial importance in an individual's life, tracking and accounting for systematic behavioral response is imperative.
In an effort to explore the effect of violence on labor market outcomes, this paper exploits information from a nationally representative longitudinal survey whose timing perfectly aligned to capture the impact of an unanticipated change in Mexico's conflict environment. The timing of the last two waves of the MxFLS, paired with the panel nature of the survey, provides the opportunity to compare the same individual in periods of low and high violence, removing potentially endogenous time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity between respondents.
The results provide evidence that the recent escalation of violence in Mexico had a particularly strong and multidimensional impact on the labor market outcomes of self-employed individuals. Specifically, I find that exposure to violent conflict leads self-employed women to leave the labor market and reduces the number of hours they work. This effect is stronger for women who report having higher levels of fear. Moreover, self-employed women are substituting hours of work with time spent on household chores. Violent crime in Mexico has also affected the labor outcomes of self-employed males. For this group of the population, the adverse relationship between conflict and economic outcomes is not driven by employment behavior, but rather through a decline in the profits that they collect. I conclude that the increasing violence in Mexico not only affects the direct participants in the Mexican Drug War but also its civilians, suggesting that it may be in the best interest of the government to mediate the negative wealth shocks the rise in violence is imposing in order to reduce the long-term impact of this conflict. 
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